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Introduction 
 The pervading theory of visual perception hypothesizes an encapsulated system 
that reconstructs an accurate three dimensional representation of the world based on 
where in the retina photons of light impinge on receptors (Goldstein, 2007).  This 
information is then sent to the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, and then to the 
occipital cortex, where, based on the position in the retina, the angles of incidence of 
various rays of light are calculated.  These visual angles are then, by use of monocular 
and binocular depth cues, as well as pictorial depth cues, summed together to re-create a 
representation of the environment that includes information not present in the two 
dimensional world which exists on the retina of the eye.  While this approach to studying 
vision – one based on looking at what information could possibly be transmitted by the 
retina and then hypothesizing a means by which it could be transformed to match our 
subjective experience of vision – has certainly been fruitful, it is far from complete. 
 We know that visual experience, at least in humans, is very often inaccurate, even 
concerning basic visual information such as spatial layout (Knoblich, Thornton, 
Grosjean, & Shiffrar, 2006; Proffitt, 2006).  If our visual system is really just re-
constructing the world based on visual angles, we would assume that such low-level 
information as horizontal distance should be nigh infallible.  This turns out to be not the 
case (see below).  However, if we look at vision through an evolutionary perspective, we 
would never assume a priori that visual angles and accurate judgments of distance would 
be necessary, or even required.  Quite on the contrary, the actual accuracy of visual 
information would only be selected for in so far as it conveyed a substantial fitness 
benefit over time.  In this light, the fallibility of the visual system would be expected.  
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These errors could persist due to one of two mechanisms: the accuracy of information 
was irrelevant to the fitness of the individual, and thus was never under any sort of 
selection pressure; or, the transmission of inaccurate information was actually beneficial, 
and so was selected for (Jackson & Cormack, 2008).  We will be chiefly concerned with 
the latter mechanism in discussing the following studies, but let us explore both ideas in 
greater depth using two animals with slightly simpler perceptual systems. 
 Anyone who has tried to keep a frog for a few days as a pet has probably 
observed that frogs will not eat dead flies.  This may seem odd, as a dead fly has the same 
nutritional value as a living one, and is arguably much easier to catch.  The truth is that 
the frog has no inherent aversion to dead flies; it just can’t see them unless they are 
moving, and furthermore, moving specifically in the erratic sort of way that living flies 
do (Lettvin, Maturana, McCullough, & Pitts, 1959).  To those of us with much more 
complex visual systems, the idea of not being able to see a dead fly is rather strange, but 
keep in mind that, until the advent of curious children with fast hands and glass jars, frogs 
never needed to see dead flies.  That is, there was no selection pressure acting on frogs to 
push the ability to identify small objects, be they flies or not.  In fact, a frog doesn’t really 
see much of anything (namely, general brightness, stationary edges, moving edges, and 
small moving dots), but what it does see is well developed and highly advantageous.  For 
example, frogs, unlike many animals with infinitely more complex visual processes, are 
quite adept at catching flies.  Their livelihood depends on it.  In addition, the circuit 
required for locating a fly and shooting the tongue in the proper direction need not be 
very large or complex at all: the retinotopy maintained in the optic tectum acts as a sort of 
spatially coded polar coordinate system, which could activate interneurons in the 
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midbrain impinging on α motor neurons controlling the tongue to extend it in the same 
direction (interestingly, this polar coordinate system is maintained in humans, and 
extends to higher cognitive areas – see Sereno & Huang, 2006).  In frogs, the perception-
action systems have not become more complex than this because they did not need to be 
more complex.  It is also worth nothing that, as one of the most metabolically complex 
and energetically expensive tissue structures in the animal, adding unnecessary brain 
matter is strongly selected against. 
 For our second example, we will consider the rabbit (this argument modified from 
Kirkpatrick, 2005).  Imagine that a rabbit sitting in a forest sees something moving 
nearby out of the corner of its eye.  Because the visual information is reduced, the rabbit 
is not sure if, for instance, it is a leaf blowing across the forest floor, or a predator close 
behind ready to pounce.  Let us assume, for the sake of this argument, that there is a 
50/50 chance of the ambiguous visual information being a leaf or a predator.  If you are 
the rabbit however, you will not treat the ambiguous visual information as having a fifty 
percent chance of being something that will try to eat you; the actual number would be 
much closer to a hundred percent.  To understand why, first note that the rabbit has two 
choices upon noticing something moving: run, and don’t run.  With the two possible 
identities of the ambiguous stimulus, this leaves four outcomes (see Figure 1). 
If the rabbit runs away, it always incurs the small metabolic cost of expending the energy 
Figure 1 
 Leaf Predator 
Run Small metabolic cost Small metabolic cost 
Don’t Run No cost Death 
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to flee, and perhaps a small opportunity cost if there was a choice carrot or something 
nearby.  On the other hand, if the rabbit does not run, it ends up dead half the time.  The 
risk of dying (which, one can safely say, does not benefit one’s genetic fitness) so 
outweighs the cost of running that the rabbit will always run.  Of course, the rabbit does 
not stop to think about probabilities and fitness costs.  Even if it had the cognitive 
capacity required for Bayesian estimation, the rabbit would not have the time to 
contemplate the issue as the predator is already so close.  In terms of a fast, metabolically 
inexpensive, and simple decision rule, it makes the most sense for the rabbit to actually 
see the ambiguous stimulus as a predator to produce the most adaptive response, even 
though this is technically incorrect.  There is still a fifty percent chance, remember, that 
we are only talking about a leaf. 
 All of this may seem like a fun thought exercise, but recent research in human 
perception, including some conducted by our lab, indicates that this same argument 
applies to humans – that is, the fitness costs and benefits are incorporated into the way we 
perceive the world around us (Knoblich, Thornton, Grosjean, & Shiffrar, 2006; Proffitt, 
2006).  In other words, at no point in the processing stream of humans is there a “just-so” 
picture of the world, from which we choose to act.  We actually see the costs of the world 
in what we call adaptively biased perception.  Let us consider a simple example.  Imagine 
two people standing at the bottom of a hill, and both are looking up towards the crest.  
One has just eaten a nutritious meal.  The other has not eaten since the evening before.  
Because walking to the top of the hill would consume a larger percentage of the hungry 
person’s available energy, we could hypothesize that he will see the hill as being more 
steep than the well-fed individual.  This turns out to be true.  When Schnall, Zadra, and 
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Proffitt (unpublished results) took students to the bottom of a hill and had them judge the 
angle, those who were given lemonade with artificial sweetener saw the hill as being 
steeper than the participants given lemonade with real sugar.  Presumably, blood sugar 
levels are acting as a signal of available energy, which the human brain incorporates into 
its perception of the world.  More complex things than available energy can also change 
the way we see the world.  Imagine those same two participants, except that this time 
they are both on top of the hill.  One of them is standing on a wooden box, the other on a 
skateboard.  When we ask them to judge the incline of the hill, we might expect that the 
person on the skateboard will see the hill as being steeper as he is in a more dangerous 
situation (i.e. the skateboard could start to roll down the hill carrying the participant with 
it).  Again, this is exactly what we find (Stefanucci et al., 2008). 
 These effects are not only limited to hills and degrees of incline however.  It is 
well established that people tend to underestimate horizontal distances once they pass a 
critical length (around 4 meters, see Cutting & Vishton, 1995).  On the other hand, this 
does not apply to vertical distances.  Most people, when placed at the bottom of a 26 foot 
balcony, will see it as being about 30 feet high – fairly accurate.  But if you put one of 
those same people at the top, they will see the distance to the ground as about 35 feet 
(Jackson & Cormack, 2007; Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009).  This overestimation may seem 
odd, as it is diametrically opposed to the underestimation characteristic of horizontal 
distances, but is not so strange if we assume that the participant is also seeing the costs 
associated with that distance.  In this case, we would expect a 26 foot balcony to appear 
higher than it is when viewed from the top, as a fall from that height would likely result 
in broken bones.  In addition, if the person at the top of that balcony is afraid of heights, 
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they report a vertical distance of about 40 feet (Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & 
Proffitt, 2008).  If you induce non-height-specific fear into that person before taking them 
to the top of the height, you will get the same effect (Stefanucci & Storbeck, 2009).  Once 
again, this does not fit the standard vision-in-a-box model of perception, but from an 
adaptive point of view is easily explained.   
 To provide a reasonable explanation for these findings of how emotions can 
change perception, we must first consider what an emotion is, and what adaptive problem 
it addresses.  If we assume, following Tooby and Cosmides’ (2000) interpretation, that an 
emotion is a cognitive signal meant to activate, deactivate, or calibrate certain brain 
functions in a context-dependent manner, the idea that an emotion could change visual 
percepts does not seem so strange.  Let’s go back to thinking about a bunny in the woods 
to make this a little more concrete.  At any given point in time, a bunny has a lot of things 
it could be doing.  It could be eating, or looking for food.  It could be tired, and looking 
for a safe place to sleep.  If the bunny sees a predator (or at least thinks that it does), it 
needs to run away to avoid being eaten.  In this context, nibbling on some grass or lying 
down to take a nap would be quite maladaptive.  On the other hand, pulling blood away 
from the gut and forcing it into skeletal muscle and increasing heart rate would be 
adaptive.  In addition, modifying the activity of the visual system to be even more 
sensitive to potential threats would also be adaptive.  This is what we mean by 
deactivation, activation, and calibration, respectively.  Also, note that these very 
responses are what characterize the emotion of fear in humans (Purves et al., 2008).  So if 
fear is a signal of danger, then we would expect it to make heights appear higher as the 
visual system encodes that same signal into the perception of the balcony. 
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 We might, at this point, stop to ponder just how far we can carry this idea.  Is our 
perception of much more complex stimuli, other people for instance, adaptively biased in 
the same manner, and furthermore with the same logic behind it?  As overwhelmingly 
social creatures, we would expect strong selection pressures constraining our perception 
of and interaction with other H. sapiens.  Given the epistemological uncertainty of 
exactly what kind of environment humans evolved in, some have argued that it is 
impossible, or at best very difficult, to predict what sorts of pressures would be operating 
on ancestral humans (Tooby & DeVore, 1987).  On first blush, this might seem like a 
good point to make, but it is based on a mistaken understanding of how natural selection 
works.  Humans, or any other species for that matter, did not only emerge in the “stone 
age”, with no genetic changes before or after.  The selection pressures that actually direct 
evolution are statistically averaged over time.  What this means is that the processing 
functions in the human brain have been evolving for millions of years, and continue to do 
so to the present day (Tooby, 1985).  Because of this, the largest organizing factors in 
brain evolution result from selection pressures, such as feeding and reproduction that 
have been present since the advent of chordates – over 500 million years ago.  Looking at 
it this way, it should be immediately evident that we share a good many selection 
pressures with rabbits and frogs.  There are, however, numerous selection pressures that 
apply to H. sapiens and not to Xenopus laevis, not the least of which is successful social 
behavior. 
 Most human social systems are very complex, with many independently changing 
variables that provide obvious confounds for perceptual research, so let us reduce the 
problem of navigating through group behavior by beginning with a simple question: how 
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do we perceive a person walking towards us, and how might this be adaptively biased?  
To address the first point, there is a wealth of literature on the perception of others, which 
we will briefly review infra. 
 Humans are extraordinarily adept at recognizing the motion of other animals 
(called “biological motion”), especially when that other animal is a H. sapien.  Research 
into this field began in the 1970’s when a Swedish psychophysicist by the name of 
Gunnar Johansson chanced upon the notion of breaking down the perception of human 
motion into the least possible amount of required information (1973).  He ended up with 
about thirteen white dots (see Figure 2, from Blake & Shiffrar, 2007).  The static picture 
of course does not look like anything other than 
white dots on a black background, but when 
animated creates a very strong sensation of 
apparent motion.  What Johansson did was 
record only the relative movement of the major 
joints in the body – ankles, knees, hips, 
shoulders, elbows, wrists, and neck – over 
time. This process of reducing a human form to 
the smallest amount of visual information 
while retaining the relative position and 
movements of the body is called motion 
capture.  Motion capture stimuli, when animated, are recognized by humans as products 
of another human’s movements in about a tenth of a second (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007).  
Furthermore, this paucity of visual information can yield, when presented to a subject for 
Figure 2 
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less than half a second, accurate judgments of gender and emotional state 
(Chouchourelou, Matsuka, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2006; Brooks et al., 2008; Jacobs, Pinto, 
& Shiffrar, 2004).  In fact, this system is robust enough to produce greater-than-chance 
judgments of sexual orientation, social dominance, intent to deceive, and, in some cases, 
even the identity of the stimulus (Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999; Provost, Troje, & 
Quinsey 2007; Haberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2004; Blake & Shiffrar, 2007; 
Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar 2005). 
 Physiologically, it appears that visual information derived from biological sources 
is special in how it is “fast-tracked” to higher cognitive areas.  After passing through V1 
and V2, biological motion is analyzed in V4 and then sent to the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) and anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991), both of 
which have been implicated as areas important for creating socially relevant information 
such as gender and emotion from human movement (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; 
Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Puce & Perrett, 2003).  The aIPS projects to the limbic 
structures such as the medial temporal lobe, cingulate cortex, and amygdala (Amaral & 
Price, 1984) either directly or via the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Purves et al., 2008), 
an area important for social cognition (for review, see Adolphs, 1999) while the STS has 
been shown to bear strong connections to the amygdala (Aggleton, Burton, & 
Passingham, 1980).  Thus, from both psychophysical and anatomical points of view, we 
have further evidence that evolution in the hominid lineage has strongly selected a brain 
that quickly and robustly creates information of social import from an extraordinarily 
small amount of visual information. 
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 But the question yet remains as to how this system might be adaptively biased.  
We propose that in fearful situations, the human visual system will perceive another 
human as being more dangerous (recall the biased response in rabbits).  We expect that 
this will translate into perceiving others as moving faster towards the observer, as 
appearing angrier, and as appearing more masculine.  Two studies were designed to test 
the effect of emotion on the perception of motion capture stimuli.  
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 analyzed the relationship between fear and the perception of the 
speed of walking and running humans.  Participants were placed into one of two groups, 
fear and non-fear.  The subjects in the fear condition were shown two sets of pictures 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) library (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005) that were rated as being both highly arousing and negatively valenced.  
After each picture set, the participants were asked to rate six motion capture stimuli 
presented as wireframes for perceived speed, gender, and portrayed emotion.  The 
subjects in the non-fear condition followed the same procedure, except that the picture 
sets they viewed were rated as low arousing and positively valenced.  Participants in the 
high arousal condition reported the wireframes as moving significantly faster, suggesting 
that aspects of arousal and/or valence might change the way individuals perceive 
biological motion.   
Method 
 Participants. Eighteen summer students in the Williamsburg area were paid $5 
each to participate in the study.  Two subjects were eliminated for failing to discriminate 
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between male and female stimuli.  Of the remaining participants, 8 were female, and 8 
were male (Mean age = 20.56 yrs). 
 Materials. Ten different stimuli (see Figure 3) were selected from Carnegie 
Mellon University’s motion capture website, available at http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/ .  Two 
of the stimuli (2_3 and 5_1) were presented twice as a test for rating invariance, for a 
total of twelve moving figures.  The motion capture data was displayed in wireframe 
format in a frontal view with the z aspect clamped using bvhacker, available at 
http://davedub.co.uk/index.html .  A Dell Flat Panel 17” LCD monitor with screen 
resolution of 1440x900 and a refresh rate of 60Hz displayed the wireframes, which were 
each approximately 5.5cm x 2cm. 
 Forty pictures characterized by 
high arousal and negative valence 
(HANV) were chosen for the fear 
condition, and another 40 pictures 
characterized by low arousal and 
positive valence (LAPV) were chosen 
for the non-fear condition based on standardized arousal and valence ratings from the 
IAPS library (see Appendix A).  Each set of 40 pictures was divided into two sets of 20 
Number Subject Trial Description 
1 2 3 run/jog 
2 2 3 run/jog 
3 9 1 run 
4 5 1 walk 
5 5 1 walk 
6 7 1 walk 
7 7 4 slow walk 
8 7 12 brisk walk 
9 82 10 sad walk 
10 105 13 sad walk 
11 82 12 happy walk 
12 105 32 scared walk 
Figure 3 
Picture set Mean Arousal Mean Valence 
High arousal negative valence 1 (HANV1) 7.09 2.03 
High arousal negative valence 2 (HANV2) 6.61 2.01 
Low arousal positive valence 1 (LAPV1) 2.99 6.76 
Low arousal positive valence 2 (LAPV2) 3.46 6.90 
Figure 4 
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pictures creating a total of four sets, two sets per condition (see Figure 4), which were 
then converted into .avi format.  In the videos, each picture is presented for 6 seconds 
with no break or masking between pictures.  Each picture set lasted 2 minutes. 
 Procedure. Participants were informed that they would be participating in an 
experiment that tested time constraints for short-term memory.  They were told that they 
would view two sets of 20 photos with a break of five minutes after each set of pictures, 
and that during this break they would rate some “motion capture things” for a lab at 
Carnegie Mellon.  The participants were instructed to rate each wireframe on three 
points: speed – on a scale of 0 to 99 were 0 means “standing still” and 99 means “as fast 
as a human can possibly run”; gender – from the two choices male or female; and 
emotion – from the five choices happy, sad, angry, scared, or neutral.  They were given a 
trial using a motion capture stimulus not utilized in the perceptual judgments for practice.  
Participants then viewed one of the picture sets from their condition (order of 
presentation was counterbalanced across participants).  After, the participants had 5 
minutes to view and rate 6 wireframes, which ran continuously until all ratings had been 
made.  The wireframes were presented in random order, which was manipulated such that 
stimuli 1-2 and 4-5 were never displayed consecutively.  After 5 minutes, the participant 
viewed the other picture set from their condition, and the other 6 wireframes.  
Participants were then told that they needed to be screened for any cognitive biases 
before the testing phase, and to report their best guess as to what the hypothesis of the 
experiment might be. 
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Results 
 The data were analyzed using a 2 (Condition: fear and non-fear) x 2 (Gender: 
male and female) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), where the independent 
variables were condition and gender, and the dependent variables were average speed 
rating, percent “male” responses, percent “happy” responses, percent “sad” responses, 
percent “scared” responses, and percent “angry” responses in order to quantify the 
nominal data.  The participants in the fear condition saw the motion capture stimuli as 
moving significantly faster (F (1) = 5.069, MSE = 57.006, p = 0.044, η2 = 0.297) (see 
Figure 5). None of the other dependent variables gave significant results for either gender 
(speed p = 0.559, % male p = 0.462, % happy p = 0.625, % sad p = 0.782, % scared p = 
Figure 5 
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0.856, % angry p = 0.283) or condition (% male p = 0.263, % happy p = 0.870, % sad p = 
0.280, % scared p = 0.891, % angry p = 0.118).  However, the data for percent “angry” 
were close to significance, and there appeared to be a trend towards a condition x gender 
interaction; there was no difference between non-fear males and females (M = .0208), but 
males in the fear condition were about three times more likely to see a motion capture 
stimulus as being angry than females in the fear condition (Mm = .1250, Mf = .0417, F (1) 
= 1.263, MSE = 0.005, p = 0.283, η2 = .095).   
 The two stimuli that were repeated twice were analyzed for correlation with the 
speed measure using Pearson’s correlation.  The two presentations of stimulus 2_3 were 
highly correlated (r (14) = 0.749, p = 0.001) as were the two presentations of stimulus 
5_1 (r (14) = 0.742, p = 0.001), which demonstrates strong rating invariance.  
Correlations of the gender and emotion measures were not tested as these gave no 
significant results in the MANOVA. 
Conclusion 
 Participants in the fear condition reported perceiving the wireframes as moving 
significantly faster than the participants in the non-fear condition.  However, this may not 
have necessarily been due to induced fear during the course of the study.  It is possible 
that the difference in perceived speed was due to a priming effect from the IAPS 
photographs, as the high arousal picture sets contained many more photographs involving 
humans.  It is also possible that the high arousal picture sets were not inducing fear in the 
participants as much as disgust, as many of the pictures in the fear condition were 
photographs of mutilated bodies and torture victims. 
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 There were also several other concerns with the results of this study, not the least 
of which being the lack of any significant differences in the perception of anger and 
gender in the study, which we had hypothesized should follow from a bias in perceiving 
others as more dangerous than they when the observer is afraid.  There was an increased 
chance for males in the 
high arousal condition 
to perceive the stimuli 
as being angrier, but 
this was not 
significant, (see Figure 
6). There is also the 
possibility that fear 
was not specifically 
biasing the perception of biological motion, but rather had an effect on general speed 
perception arising from activity in lower visual cortices (e.g. V2).  The small sample size 
of this study also raised some concerns. 
 To correct for these potential confounds, a different mood induction procedure, 
namely written recall, was utilized in Experiment 2 as it does not involve looking at 
photographs.  This also allowed for greater control of induced emotion (i.e. fear versus 
disgust).  The motion capture stimuli were prepared so that they could be presented in 
both the forward and reverse running/walking directions, which would potentially allow 
for the elimination of the possibility that fear induces greater global perception of speed.  
In hopes of getting better data on perceived gender and emotion, participants were 
Figure 6 
Niederhut 16 
instructed to rate each on a scale instead of providing nominal responses.  Experiment 2 
also utilized a much larger sample. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 analyzed the relationship between fear and biological motion 
perception using written recall of frightening and non-fear associated memories (see 
Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996).  Those who reported feeling frightened 
during the recall perceived the motion capture stimuli as moving faster when the stimuli 
were approaching the participant, but not when the stimuli were moving away.  Males in 
the study perceived the motion capture stimuli as angrier when approaching, and more 
scared when moving away than did females in the study.  Nervousness produced a strong 
effect on speed and anger in both directions.  The results support the hypothesis that 
biological speed perception is adaptively biased by fear, but no significant effect was 
found for perceived anger due to fear in the observer.  Interestingly, males appear to see 
people approaching them as angry, and those moving away as afraid, suggesting that 
males sort others into threat categories based on observed movement.  The surprising role 
of nervousness in the perception of biological motion may indicate that, in states of 
uncertainty, the brain defaults to an “assume the worst” strategy. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and ten undergraduates at the College of William and 
Mary participated in the study for course credit towards an introductory psychology 
lecture.  Four participants were eliminated for not having normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision.  Of the remaining 106, seven were missing some data points for the manipulation 
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check.  56% of the participants were female, and the sample had a mean age of 18.65 
years. 
 Materials. Six different stimuli were selected from Carnegie Mellon University’s 
online motion capture database (see Figure 7).  Two videos lasting approximately one 
minute each were prepared for each stimulus – one with the motion capture stimulus 
presented in the forward direction, and the other from the behind.  These were 
constructed using bvhacker (see supra) and presented with Windows Media Player.  The 
stimuli were presented on the same monitor, and with the same dimensions as described 
in Experiment 1.  No 
participant required more 
than one minute of 
exposure to any stimulus 
to complete the stimulus 
ratings. 
 
 Emotions were 
induced using a standard 
written recall protocol (see Siegel & Stefanucci, 2009), first outlining, and then writing a 
narrative with the following prompts in the fear and happy conditions, respectively: 
In as much detail as possible, please write an outline for a story about the most 
frightening experience you’ve had in the last five years.   
In as much detail as possible, please write a story about the most frightening experience 
you’ve had in the last five years.  Try to write it with enough detail that a person you’ve 
never met might begin to feel scared. 
In as much detail as possible, please write an outline for a story about the happiest 
experience you’ve had in the last five years.   
Number Subject Trial View Description 
1 105 32 front scared walk 
2 105 13 back sad walk 
3 7 12 front brisk walk 
4 105 13 front sad walk 
5 9 1 front run 
6 7 1 back walk 
7 2 3 front jog 
8 105 32 back scared walk 
9 7 1 front walk 
10 7 12 back brisk walk 
11 9 1 back run 
12 2 3 back jog 
Trial1 5 1 back walk 
Trial2 7 4 front slow walk 
Trial3 82 12 front happy walk 
Figure 7 
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In as much detail as possible, please write a story about the happiest experience you’ve 
had in the last five years.  Try to write it with enough detail that a person you’ve never 
met might begin to feel happy. 
The mood induction procedure was verified using a modified 5 point Likert scale (see 
Figure 8) which asked for ratings of how anxious, afraid, calm, nervous, scared, and at 
ease the participants felt both during the writing task, and while they were actually 
experiencing the event. 
 Very 
Slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit  Extremely 
Anxious      
Afraid      
Calm      
Nervous      
At ease      
Scared      
 
 Procedure. Participants were informed that they were participating in a study 
analyzing how people write from outlines.  They were told that they would have five 
minutes to create an outline for a narrative in accordance with the prompt at the top of the 
page, would take a five minute break, and then be asked to write a narrative based on the 
outline they had created but would not be able to look at it while completing the narrative 
portion of the task.  The participants were then asked if, during the break, they would 
mind providing perceptual estimates of speed, gender, and emotion for motion capture 
output produced by the computer science department at Carnegie Mellon.  They were 
instructed to rate speed on a scale of 0 – 99, where 0 means “standing still” and 99 means 
“as fast as a human can possibly run”; gender on a scale of 1 – 6, where 1 means 
“completely masculine” and 6 means “completely feminine”; and each of the emotions 
happy, sad, angry, and scared on a scale of 1 – 6, where 1 means the stimulus is “not at 
Figure 8 
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all” experiencing the emotion and 6 means it is “completely” experiencing that emotion.  
These scales were displayed above the monitor during the perceptual estimates, and 
participants were encouraged to refer to it as needed during the experiment.  Before 
administering the first part of the writing task, subjects were run through three test trials 
of perceptual estimates to make sure they felt comfortable using the scales.  Participants 
were then asked to complete the outline portion of the writing task, for which they were 
given five minutes.  After the allotted time had passed, participants were asked to keep 
the outline in mind as they viewed the motion capture stimuli, so as to facilitate the 
narrative portion of the writing task. Six of the stimuli were then presented in random 
order, and perceptual estimates were recorded by verbal report while the subject was still 
viewing each stimulus.  After the first set of stimuli, the participants were asked to 
complete the narrative portion of the writing task.  After five minutes had elapsed, the 
remaining six stimuli were presented in random order, and perceptual estimates were 
recorded for each.  The manipulation check was then issued, and the experimenter asked 
the participant to guess the purpose of the study in order to screen for any cognitive 
biases.  Participants were then debriefed. 
Results 
 The results of the manipulation check were run in a 2 (Condition: fear and non-
fear) x 2 (Gender: male and female) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to test 
the validity of the manipulation check.  How scared the participants reported feeling 
during the recall task was significantly greater in the fear condition (F (1) = 2.355, MSE 
= 0.227, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.097).  How calm (F (1) = 6.626, MSE = 1.128, p = 0.017, η2 = 
0.057) at how at ease (F (1) = 8.500, MSE = 1.319, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.081) the participants 
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reported feeling were significantly smaller in the fear condition.  There were no 
significant differences in reports of how anxious, how afraid, or how nervous the 
participants felt during the recall task (anxious (F (1) = 3.581, MSE = 0.769, p = 0.061, η2 
= 0.036; afraid F (1) = 0.791, MSE = 0.440, p = 0.183, η2 = 0.018; nervous F (1) = 2.243, 
MSE = 0.791, p = 0.137, η2 = 0.023).  There were no significant effects for the gender of 
the participant. 
 The data from the perceptual estimates of the motion capture stimuli were run in a 
2x2x4x4x5x4x5x3x5x5x5x5x5x5 MANOVA, with gender, condition, and the output 
from the manipulation check serving as independent variables.  The dependent variables 
were averages of the perceived speed, gender, anger, fear, happiness, and sadness from 
the forward and reverse directions.  There was no significant difference between the two 
writing conditions for any of the dependent variables. 
 The perceived speed of the stimuli moving forward was significantly larger as the 
participants reported feeling more afraid (F (2) = 3.679, MSE = 82.873, p = 0.032, η2 = 
0.122; see Figure 9), but 
there was no statistically 
significant difference if 
the stimuli was moving 
away from the participant 
(F (2) = 1.970, MSE = 
112.314, p = 0.149, η2 = 
0.069).  Self-reported 
Figure 9 
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nervousness during the study significantly increased the perceived speed of the stimuli 
from the front (F (3) = 4.459, MSE = 82.873, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.202) and back (F (3) = 
3.462, MSE = 112.314, p = 0.023, η2 = 0.164). There was also a strong influence of self 
report of feeling at ease during the study, with significant increases in perceived speed 
from the front (F (4) = 3.950, MSE = 82.873, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.230) and back (F (4) = 
2.748, MSE = 112.314, p = 0.038, η2 = 0.172) as ease increased.    
 There were no significant effects for rating the gender of the stimulus for any of 
the independent variables. 
 The gender of the 
participant showed 
significant effects on 
perceived anger from the 
front, where males 
perceived figures moving 
towards them as angrier 
than females (F (1) = 5.166, 
MSE = 0.566, p = 0.027, η2 = 0.089; see Figure 10) and perceived fear from the back, 
where males perceived stimuli moving away from them as being more scared than 
females (F (1) = 4.906, MSE = 0.497, p = 0.031, η2 = 0.085; see Figure 11).  Higher 
levels of reported nervousness during the recall task significantly increased the perceived 
anger from the front (F (3) = 4.117, MSE = 0.566, p = 0.011, η2 = 0.189) and back (F (3) 
= 2.830, MSE = 0.603, p = 0.047, η2 = 0.138).  Removing participants who had either 
guessed the purpose of the study or had been uncooperative during the experiment did not 
Figure 10 
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remove any of the above values from significance, suggesting that these results are 
independent of cognitive bias and intent to provide faulty data. 
 There were only three instances 
where emotions experienced when the 
event from the writing task had actually 
occurred (i.e. not emotions felt during 
the experiment) that had significant 
effects on perceptual ratings, and two of 
these were not significant after 
removing participants that demonstrated 
cognitive bias during the study, and thus 
were not considered robust.  The remaining significant value was an increase in perceived 
speed from the front as participants reported feeling more nervous during their actual 
experience of the recalled event (F (4) = 2.997, MSE = 82.873, p = 0.027, η2 = 0.183). 
Discussion 
 The results of the manipulation check were unsatisfying in that there was no 
significant difference in reports of how afraid the participants felt during the recall task, 
even though how scared they felt significantly increased in the fear condition.  While the 
data show that feelings of being calm and at ease significantly decreased in the fear 
condition, there was also no corresponding increase in feelings of anxiety or nervousness.  
However, as the significant effects on perception in this study were driven by the results 
of the manipulation check and not by the experimental condition per se, the possibility 
Figure 11 
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that the mood induction procedure failed to induce the desired emotional manipulation 
does not negate the validity of the results. 
 In line with our hypothesis, the perception of the speed of others increased 
significantly when afraid, but only when the other person was approaching the observer.  
It is important to note that the motion capture stimuli were frozen in the z plane, that is, 
the figures did not grow larger or smaller as they moved towards or away from the 
participant. Therefore, this effect can not be a result of perceptual looming (Haselton, 
Nettle, & Andrews, 2005).  The speed effect was confirmed using a different mood 
induction procedure than the IAPS, indicating that the effect is likely independent of 
visual priming.  In this experiment, the effect of condition on reported speed was not 
significant, suggesting that fear in otherwise happy situations, indeed the happiest that the 
participants could think of, still resulted in perceiving faster human movement.  On the 
other hand, the results of both studies failed to validate our prediction that scared 
individuals would perceive others as being angrier.  This was probably not a result of the 
faulty experimental design, as this study gave significant results for other variables 
related to perceiving the emotional states of the motion capture stimuli. 
 Surprisingly, the largest effect sizes in this study were for reported levels of 
nervousness during the experiment, which caused participants to perceive the wireframes 
as significantly faster and angrier when the stimulus was moving towards and away from 
the participant.  However unexpected, this remains an interpretable result in the Tooby 
and Cosmides (2000) theory of the purpose of emotion: if an emotion is a signal of 
environmental state, it makes intuitive sense that nervousness would be a signal of 
uncertainty.  In a state of uncertainty, it is entirely possible that the perceptual system is 
Niederhut 24 
defaulting to an “assume the worst” scenario in order to best avoid unpredictable fitness 
costs.  That is to say, in this situation, the stimuli appeared to be angrier and quicker 
because that assumption carries a much smaller risk of harm than perceiving others as 
friendly when they might not be. 
 Also interesting is the gender difference in emotional measures.  Males not only 
reported wireframes as being angrier when approaching them, but also as more afraid 
when moving away from them than did females in the study.  As has repeatedly been 
observed, male humans are generally more aggressive than females (Hines, 2004), and 
this perceptual difference may reflect an adaptive strategy for males to perceive others in 
terms of their potential to cause physical harm.  A similar trend observed in the first study 
suggests that this difference may not be constitutive, but rather is driven by fear or high 
levels of arousal in males.  It is also possible that, as all of the stimuli that had gender 
information available in this study were male and the vast majority of the stimuli in the 
first study were also male, this result could reflect within-gender biases arising from 
sexual and status competition that were simply not present in the female participants 
because they were not looking at stimuli created from female body structures.   
 Contrary to our expectations, there were no significant differences in the 
perceived gender of the stimuli.  It is possible that masculinity and femininity are not 
biased in the context of fear because gender, in most situations, is not independently a 
predictor of the ability of another to inflict harm.  It may be true that any significant 
differences in perception would have to do with the size, height, or perceived strength of 
the stimulus.  However, this lack of effect may also be due, as noted above, to the 
probable lack of female stimuli in the study. 
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General Discussion 
 These results demonstrate that the perception of the speed and portrayed emotion 
of motion capture stimuli can be changed by inducing an emotion.  Specifically, these 
two studies have shown that, when afraid, participants tend to see stimuli as moving 
faster when they are moving towards the observer, but not necessarily when the stimulus 
is moving away.  We have also demonstrated that nervousness causes the observer to 
perceive the stimuli as moving faster and being angrier, regardless of the direction of 
locomotion.  There was also an effect of gender on the perceived emotion of others in 
Experiment 2, though whether this is modulated by emotion and/or the gender of the 
stimuli is unclear, and this result is only tentative as there was no significant effect for 
gender in Experiment 1. 
 We can generalize these effects from motion capture stimuli to real people that an 
observer may encounter outside of the laboratory given that an enormous body of 
literature suggests that motion capture is a viable model for human stimuli, due to shared 
cortical regions for the perception and analysis of motion capture and real biological 
motion (Battelli, Cavanagh, & Thornton, 2003; Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Beauchamp, 
Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2003) and the extraordinary accuracy of perceptual judgments of 
motion capture stimuli (see supra, or Blake & Shiffrar, 2007 for review).  It remains 
unclear how much of the “body language” that is preserved by the process of converting 
human movement into these stimuli accounts for any changes in perception of others in 
the real world, and how much is attributable to other factors such as facial expressions or 
verbally expressed information.  However, research done by Leslie Duncan (2005) in 
disease avoidance mechanisms suggests that symbolic language plays a very small role in 
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our perceptions of others and our behavioral responses towards them.  Furthermore, if we 
accept that selection pressures have created a visual system that biases our perception of 
others in an emotionally-dependent manner, it also follows that this system would be 
selected to act at the lowest level of cortical processing possible and with the least 
amount of visual information needed, so that it is both fast and robust in a variety of 
circumstances.  For any given individual, it makes sense that this system should utilize 
bodily motion as it probably requires less processing power than both language and facial 
expressions, and places less of a demand on visual acuity than face perception, which 
would allow adaptive visual biases to persist both at a large distance and in situations 
with low signal-to-noise ratios (e.g. part of the other person’s body is visually occluded).  
In addition, the body language of another is likely a more honest signal of emotion than 
language or facial expression.  It seems much more likely that a person could say they are 
not chasing after someone else in order to grievously injure them, or do so while smiling, 
than it is that they could do so while calmly strolling.  Thus, even if all three signals 
required the same amount of processing power, and took the same amount of time, it is 
much more likely that selection would have favored the use of body language in social 
situations as this would lead to deception less often. 
 We also feel reasonably confident that these findings are the result of an adaptive 
bias in perception, even though many have argued that such evolutionary arguments are 
not valid.  It is of course impossible to observe the social situations that existed in our 
evolutionary history, but then again, we do not need to.  All that is required to produce 
the selection pressures necessary to favor humans with the adaptive visual biases 
discussed here is that these people lived in groups and occasionally were in competition 
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with each other.  It seems absurd to argue that humans lived predominately or entirely in 
social isolation and only within the past few thousand years banded together into groups, 
not leaving evolution enough time to mold our psychology to produce adaptive responses 
to various situations that arise as a result of group living.  Furthermore, as the majority of 
selection pressures for any organism, and especially for social organisms, are 
intraspecific due to niche limitations, the burden of proof must rest in this case upon 
whomever is arguing that Homo sapiens had somehow entirely avoided this, as this 
seems much less likely (Dawkins, 1976).   
 While the studies reported here do not address other aspects of visual perception 
such as non-biological motion, let alone perception in other modalities, we feel that the 
idea of adaptive biases in perception generalize across the other senses as well.  Looking 
back to our Bayesian model of a rabbit’s behavior towards ambiguous stimuli, it seems 
rather unlikely that the response to a leaf moving in the visual periphery would differ 
much from the noise that said leaf would make if moving out of sight of the rabbit.  
However, we need not speculate here.  Stefanucci and Storbeck (2009) have shown that 
the perception of height is biased in an adaptive manner when participants are aroused.  
Also, putting an observer on a skateboard at the top of the hill causes them to perceive 
that hill as steeper than participants who are standing on a box of the same height 
(Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008).  Stefanucci’s research on fear and the 
perception of heights also fits nicely within the idea of adaptively biased perception, as 
does recent work by Siegel and Stefanucci (2009) on fear and auditory perception. 
 Given that perception has now been reasonably demonstrated to be biased, and 
furthermore biased in an adaptive manner, it seems ill-advised to yet consider the 
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perceptual system as encapsulated.  This has implications beyond sensory perception 
itself, however, two of which we will address infra. 
 The clinical implications of this work apply to mood disorders, specifically 
phobias and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Both of these are typically 
characterized by an inappropriate response to environmental stimuli, but the research 
discussed here provides another interpretation.  As the way an observer perceives 
something can be quite easily modulated, it is possible that patients presenting with 
acrophobia are actually seeing the height as higher and/or more dangerous.  This is, in 
fact, what has been observed when measuring this population’s perception of height (see 
Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009; Teachman et al., 2008).  In this case, the response is no 
longer inappropriate, as it is warranted by the different perception of the stimulus.  
Likewise, PTSD is partially characterized by inappropriate violent outbursts.  However, if 
we are willing to accept that the initial traumatic event may have pushed what is usually 
an adaptive bias in perception further than it would normally go, it makes sense that a 
patient suffering from PTSD could perceive others as moving quicker, and generally 
being angrier and more threatening much more often than the normal population.  Once 
again, in this scenario, the violent response of the patient is no longer inappropriate, but 
logically follows from what the patient actually perceives.  Obviously, more research is 
needed in this area. 
 The other, broader implication of this work has to do with the standard model of 
the brain, which Susan Hurley (2008) derogatorily referred to as the “sandwich model”.  
The basic concept is that there is a perceptual system, cognitive system, and motor 
planning system.  The perceptual system re-creates an accurate model of the world 
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(Goldstein, 2007).  The cognitive system looks at this model, and chooses an appropriate 
response, which the motor system then executes (Purves et al., 2008).  However, if 
sensory information is adaptively biased, that is, it is modified in an adaptive manner as 
soon as it impinges on receptors and then continually as it progresses through the 
perceptual system, than the cognitive system has no model at which to look.  At this 
point, the most useful purpose the cognitive system could serve is to continue that 
modification of information until it finally ends up as a muscle movement at an α motor 
neuron, in what is not so much a sandwich model as it is a gradient model of brain 
function.  There are of course other logical, metabolic, computational, anatomical, and 
cytoarchitectural arguments in support of abandoning the standard model, but they are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 In conclusion, we have demonstrated in these two experiments that the perception 
of biological motion is altered by the emotional state of the observer, and further, that the 
observed changes in perception are what one would predict for a system designed to 
maximize fitness.  This idea of adaptively biased perception is corroborated by research 
done by Stefanucci, Proffitt, and others.  It has been further argued that this research 
provides evidence against the encapsulated model of perception, and instead supports a 
model in which incoming sensory information is quickly and efficiently modified into a 
form useful for guiding adaptive behaviors. 
Acknowledgments 
 This research was funded in part by the Dintersmith Fellowship for 
Undergraduate Research, made possible by the generosity of Ted Dintersmith, College of 
William and Mary class of 1974.  
Niederhut 30 
Works Cited 
Adolphs, R. (1999). Social cognition and the human brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
3, 469-479. 
Aggleton, J., Burton, M., & Passingham, R. (1980). Cortical and subcortical afferents to 
the amygdala of the rhesus monkey (Macaca mulata). Brain Research, 190, 347-
368. 
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from visual cues: role of 
the STS region. Trends in Cognitive Science, 4, 267-278. 
Amaral, D., & Price, J. (1984). Amygdalo-cortical projections in the monkey (Macaca 
fascicularis). The Journal of Comparative Neurology, 230, 465-496. 
Ambady, N., Hallahan, M., & Conner, B. (1999). Accuracy of judgments of sexual 
orientation from thin slices of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77, 538-547. 
Battelli L, Cavanagh P, Thornton IM. 2003. Perception of biological motion in parietal 
patients. Neuropsychologia 41:1808–16 
Beauchamp MS, Lee KE, Haxby JV, Martin A. 2003. fMRI responses to video and point-
light displays of moving humans and manipulable objects. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 
15:991–1001 
Blake, R., & Shiffrar, M. (2007). Perception of human motion. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 58, 47-73. 
Blakemore, S. & Decety, J. (2001). From the perception of action to the understanding of 
intention. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 561-567. 
Niederhut 31 
Brooks, A., Schouten, B., Troje, N., Verfaillie, K., Blanke, O., & van der Zwan, R. 
(2008). Correlated changes in perceptions of gender and orientation of ambiguous 
biological motion figures. Current Biology, 18, 728-729. 
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2000). Evolutionary psychology and the emotions. In Lewis, 
M., & Haviland-Jones, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions, 2nd Edition. New York, 
NY: Guilford. 
Chouchourelou, A., Matsuka, T., Harber, K., & Shiffrar, M. (2006). The visual analysis 
of emotional actions. Social Neuroscience, 1, 63-74. 
Cutting, J. E., & Vishton, P. M. (1995). Perceiving layout and knowing distances: The 
integration, relative potency, and contextual use of different information about 
depth. In W. Epstein & S. J. Rogers (Eds.), Perception of space and motion. 
Handbook of perception and cognition (2nd ed., pp. 69-117). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press. 
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Duncan, L. (2005). Heuristic cues automatically activate disease cognitions despite 
rational knowledge to the contrary.  Unpublished masters dissertation, University 
of British Columbia, Kelowna. 
Felleman, D. & Van Essen, D. (1991).  Distributed hierarchical processing in the primate 
cerebral cortex.  Cerebral Cortex, 1, 1-47. 
Goldstein, E. (2007) Sensation and perception. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. 
Haberlein, A., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (2004). Cortical regions for 
judgments of emotions and personality traits from point-light walkers. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 1143-1158. 
Niederhut 32 
Hamilton A., & Grafton, S. (2006). Goal representation in human anterior intraparietal 
sulcus. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 1133-1137. 
Haselton, M., Nettle, D., & Andrews, P. (2005).  The evolution of cognitive bias. In: 
Buss, D. (Ed). The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology.  Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 
& Sons. 
Hines, M. (2004). Brain Gender. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Hurley, S. (2008). The shared circuits model (SCM): How control, mirroring, and 
simulation can enable imitation, deliberation, and mindreading. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 31, 1-58. 
Jackson, R. E., & Cormack, L. K. (2007). Evolved navigation theory and the descent 
illusion. Perception & Psychophysics, 69, 353-362. 
Jackson, R. & Cormack, L. (2008).  Evolved navigation theory and the environmental 
vertical illusion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 299-304.  
Jacobs, A., Pinto, J., & Shiffrar, M. (2004). Experience, context, and the visual 
perception of human movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 30, 822-835. 
Johansson, G. (1973). Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis. 
Perception and Psychophysics, 14, 201-211. 
Kirkpatrick, L. (2005). Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion. New 
York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Knoblich, G., Thornton, I., Grosjean, M., & Shiffrar, M. (Eds). (2006). Human body 
perception from the inside out. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Niederhut 33 
Lang, P., Bradley, M., & Cuthbert, B. (2005). International affective picture system 
(IAPS): Instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical Report A-6, The 
Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
Lettvin, J., Maturana, H., McCullough, W., & Pitts, W. (1959). What the frog’s eye tells 
the frog’s brain. Proc Inst Radio Engr, 47, 1940–1951. 
Loula, F., Prasad, S., Harber, K., & Shiffrar, M. (2005). Recognizing people from their 
movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 31, 210-220. 
Proffitt, D. (2006).  Embodied perception and the economy of action.  Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 1(2), 110-122. 
Provost, M., Troje, N., & Quinsey, V. (2008).  Short-term mating strategies and attraction 
to masculinity in point-light walkers.  Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 65-69. 
Puce, A., & Perrett, D. (2003). Electrophysiology and brain imaging of biological 
motion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 358, 435-
445. 
Purves, D., Brannon, E., Cabeza, R., Huettel, S., LaBar, K., Platt, M., & Woldorf, M. 
(2008). Principles of Cognitive Neuroscience. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer 
Associates. 
Sereno, M. & Huang, R. (2006). A human parietal face area contains aligned head-
centered visual and tactile maps.  Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1337-1343. 
Stefanucci, J. K., & Proffitt, D. R. (2009). The roles of altitude and fear in the perception 
of heights. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance, 35, 424-438.  
Niederhut 34 
Stefanucci, J., Proffitt, D., Clore, G., & Parekh, N. (2008). Skating down a steeper slope: 
Fear influences the perception of geographical slant. Perception, 37, 321-323. 
 Siegel, E., & Stefanucci, J. (2009). Fear influences the perception of sounds and smells. 
Manuscript in preparation. 
Stefanucci, J. K., & Storbeck, J. (2009). Don’t look down: Emotional arousal elevates 
height perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 131-145. 
Teachman, B., Stefanucci, J., Clerkin, E., Cody, M., & Proffitt, D. (2008).  A new mode 
of fear expression: perceptual bias in height fear.  Emotion, 8, 296-301. 
Tooby, J. (1985).  The emergence of evolutionary psychology.  In: Pines, D. (Ed). 
Emerging Syntheses in Science. Santa Fe, NM: Santa Fe Institute. 
Tooby, J., & DeVore, I. (1987).  The reconstruction of hominid behavioral evolution 
through strategic modeling.  In: Kinzey, W. (Ed). The Evolution of Human 
Behavior: Primate Models. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Westermann, R., Spies, K., Stahl, G., & Hesse, F. (1996). Relative effectiveness and 
 validity of mood induction procedures: a meta-analysis. European Journal of 
 Psychology, 26, 557-580. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Picture set pleasurearousaldominance number pleasure ple_SD arousal aro_SD 
HANV1 Aimed Gun 6,230.00 2.37 1.57 7.35 2.01 
  Mutilation 3,000.00 1.59 1.35 7.34 2.27 
  Attack 6,350.00 1.90 1.29 7.29 1.87 
  Mutilation 3,010.00 1.79 1.28 7.26 1.86 
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  Mutilation 3,000.00 1.45 1.20 7.26 2.10 
  Mutilation 3,080.00 1.48 0.95 7.22 1.97 
  Baby tumor 3,170.00 1.46 1.01 7.21 1.99 
  Mutilation 3,010.00 1.71 1.19 7.16 2.24 
  Mutilation 3,060.00 1.79 1.56 7.12 2.09 
  Attack 6,550.00 2.73 2.38 7.09 1.98 
  Soldier 9,410.00 1.51 1.15 7.07 2.06 
  Attack 3,500.00 2.21 1.34 6.99 2.19 
  Mutilation 3,130.00 1.58 1.24 6.97 2.07 
  Attack 6,510.00 2.46 1.58 6.96 2.09 
  Attack 6,313.00 1.98 1.38 6.94 2.23 
  Snake 1,120.00 3.79 1.93 6.93 1.68 
  AimedGun 6,260.00 2.44 1.54 6.93 1.93 
  AimedGun 6,250.10 2.63 1.74 6.92 1.92 
  Severed hand 3,400.00 2.35 1.90 6.91 2.22 
  Burn victim 3,053.00 1.31 0.97 6.91 2.57 
HANV2 Mutilation 3,071.00 1.88 1.39 6.86 2.05 
  Dead body 3,120.00 1.56 1.09 6.84 2.36 
  Attack 6,540.00 2.19 1.56 6.83 2.14 
  Attack 3,530.00 1.80 1.32 6.82 2.09 
  Injury 3,266.00 1.56 0.98 6.79 2.09 
  Mutilation 3,030.00 1.91 1.56 6.76 2.10 
  Burn victim 3,110.00 1.79 1.30 6.70 2.16 
  Dead body 9,252.00 1.98 1.59 6.64 2.33 
  Knife 6,300.00 2.59 1.66 6.61 1.97 
  War victim 9,250.00 2.57 1.39 6.60 1.87 
  Burn victim 3,102.00 1.40 1.14 6.58 2.69 
  Mutilation 3,150.00 2.26 1.57 6.55 2.20 
  Dead body 3,140.00 1.83 1.17 6.36 1.97 
  Attack 6,560.00 2.16 1.41 6.53 2.42 
  Fire 9,921.00 2.04 1.47 6.52 1.94 
  Burn victim 3,100.00 1.60 1.07 6.49 2.23 
  Ship 9,600.00 2.48 1.62 6.46 2.31 
  Attack 6,370.00 2.70 1.52 6.44 2.19 
  Mutilation 3,064.00 1.45 0.97 6.41 2.62 
  Abduction 6,312.00 2.48 1.52 6.37 2.30 
LAPV1 Leaves 5,800.00 6.36 1.70 2.51 2.01 
  Violin 7,900.00 6.50 1.72 2.60 2.08 
  Flower 5,000.00 7.08 1.77 2.67 1.99 
  Flower 5,030.00 6.51 1.73 2.74 2.13 
  Farmland 5,720.00 6.31 1.60 2.79 2.20 
  Gannet 1,450.00 6.37 1.62 2.83 1.87 
  Girl 2,320.00 6.17 1.51 2.90 1.89 
  ThreeMen 2,370.00 7.14 1.46 2.90 2.14 
  Flower 5,010.00 7.14 1.50 3.00 2.25 
  Cow 1,670.00 6.81 1.76 3.05 1.91 
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  Rabbit 1,610.00 7.82 1.34 3.08 2.19 
  Couple 2,501.00 6.89 1.78 3.09 2.21 
  Clouds 5,870.00 6.78 1.76 3.10 2.22 
  Nature 5,750.00 6.60 1.84 3.14 2.25 
  NeutChild 2,270.00 6.28 1.62 3.15 2.03 
  Flowers 5,200.00 7.36 1.52 3.20 2.16 
  Nature 5,760.00 8.05 1.23 3.22 2.39 
  Ocean 7,545.00 6.84 1.72 3.28 2.34 
  Bicyclist 5,875.00 6.03 1.43 3.29 2.12 
  Violinist 5,410.00 6.11 1.58 3.29 2.09 
LAPV2 Flower 5,020.00 6.32 1.68 2.63 2.10 
  Clouds 5,891.00 7.22 1.46 3.29 2.57 
  Butterfly 1,604.00 7.11 1.41 3.30 2.17 
  Adult 2,000.00 6.51 1.83 3.32 2.07 
  Adult 2,010.00 6.25 1.84 3.32 2.07 
  Butterfly 1,603.00 6.90 1.48 3.37 2.20 
  Butterfly 1,602.00 6.50 1.64 3.43 1.96 
  Fish 1,900.00 6.65 1.80 3.46 2.32 
  Sprgbok 1,620.00 7.37 1.56 3.54 2.34 
  Watermelon 7,325.00 7.06 1.65 3.55 2.07 
  Courtyard 5,779.00 7.33 1.42 3.57 2.30 
  Elephants 1,812.00 6.83 1.33 3.60 2.11 
  Girl 2,304.00 7.22 1.31 3.63 2.15 
  Family 2,360.00 7.70 1.76 3.66 2.32 
  Ice cream 7,340.00 6.68 1.63 3.69 2.58 
  Nature 5,780.00 7.52 1.45 3.75 2.54 
  Sunflower 5,001.00 7.16 1.56 3.79 2.34 
  Woman 2,620.00 5.93 1.63 2.72 2.16 
  Nature 5,201.00 7.06 1.71 3.83 2.49 
  Balloons 2,791.00 6.64 1.70 3.83 2.09 
